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Introduction
John is a lion. 38
The ham sandwich is getting impatient. 39
40
In (1), the VP began a book is compatible with several readings, each involving a 41 different event (e.g., reading/writing/mending/dusting/ripping up… etc.). It is 42 common to refer to constructions of this type as 'logical metonymy' 43 (Pustejovsky, 1995) , where the argument of the verb in syntax is different from 44 that argument in 'logical form': In (1), the idea would be that the NP a book 45 denotes part of an event, which is used to stand for the event as a whole (e.g., the 46 VP 'reading a book'). The interpretation of the adjective good in (2) requires a 47 specification of its conceptual content (e.g., 'good reads'), which would be 48 different from the one it has in, e.g., good knife/football player/weather/child, and 49 so on (Katz, 1964) . The alternations between the different senses of the noun 50 rabbit in (3) -'rabbit remains', rabbit meat', 'rabbit fur' -is standardly analysed 51 as a form of systematic (or regular) polysemy (Apresjan, 1974 ) where the 52 related senses of a word are predictable on the basis of the ontological category 53 of its denotation (cf. other animal terms; crocodile, seal, mink, lamb, etc.). Finally, 54 in (4) and (5), we have a metaphorical use of the noun lion ('strong, courageous, 55 takes risks', etc.), derived on the basis of properties associated with the animal 56 denotation (e.g., Glucksberg, 2001) , and a metonymic use of the NP The ham 57 sandwich ('the person who ordered the ham sandwich'), based on a contextually 58 salient association between the ham sandwich and the person who ordered it 59 (Nunberg, 1979) . Such metaphorical and metonymical extensions are usually 60 taken to be prime sources of polysemy in language. 61 'core meaning approaches' take polysemy to be represented in terms of a single, 88 maximally general meaning, from which the appropriate one is contextually 89 derived (e.g., Caramazza & Grober, 1976; Ruhl, 1989) . A challenge for this kind of 90 approach is to determine the appropriate level of abstraction for defining the 91 core meaning of a lexical item, in order to capture what is common to all its 92 possible, sometimes radically different uses. In between these two extreme 93 views we find several 'middle-ground approaches', assuming only a limited 94 number of stored senses of a lexical item and the rest to be derived in context 95 (e.g., Carston, 2002; Tyler & Evans, 2003) , sometimes combined with a proposal 96 for a principled set of criteria for distinguishing between those senses that are 97 stored in the lexicon and those that are constructed on-line in language use 98 (Tyler & Evans, 2003) . This kind of approach, involving a differential 99 representation of polysemous senses (some may be stored, some may be 100 contextually derived) is supported by experimental evidence (e.g., 101 Klepousniotou, 2007; Klepousniotou, Titone, & Romero, 2008; Pylkkänen, Llinás, 102 linguistically encoded in order to derive the speaker-intended meaning, as the 176 context-sensitive expressions make reference to the discourse situation in which 177 they were uttered. So, code-models of communication need some way to account 178 for how hearers assign contextually appropriate meanings to the expressions 179 used (see Sperber & Wilson, 1986 , for a more extensive critique of such 180 communication models). 181
Rule-based approaches to polysemy can be seen as modern, sophisticated 182 versions of the code-model of communication as described above, in which a 183 considerable amount of the context-sensitivity of lexical meanings is built into 184 the linguistic system. More specifically, polysemy is seen as being generated by a 185 set of lexicon-internal generative rules, which operate over information-rich 186 semantic representations to yield default interpretations (Asher, satisfied by the surface syntactic structure, a coercion mechanism changes the 199 denotation of the NP from an entity into an event consistent with eventive 200 information stored as part of the lexical representation of the noun. In (8), the 201 appropriate event would be provided by the so-called telic role of the noun: 202 7 More explicitly, Pustejovsky's (1995: 111) suggestion is that each expression a may have a set of shifting operators available to it, which he calls Sa, which may operate over an expression to change its type and denotation: FUNCTION This type of approach was originally proposed by Pustejovsky (1991, 207 1995), whose main aim was to provide a more explanatory account of polysemy 208 than a mere listing of senses in the lexicon (cf. Katz, 1972) . A more promising 209 approach, he argued, which captures how word senses may partially overlap and 210 be logically related to each other, is a lexicon where items are decomposed into 211 information-rich templates, so-called qualia structures, combined with a set of 212 generative mechanisms for the composition of lexical meanings. 213
An advantage of this rule-based theory of the processing of logical 214 metonymy is that it accounts for clear interpretive tendencies in uninformative 215 contexts (in the absence of any further contextual clues the preferred or 'default' 216 interpretation of (8) would be that 'Kate began reading a book' (or writing it), 217 and not that she, e.g., began ripping it up). The availability of such preferred 218 readings is often taken as evidence of a linguistic-semantic process. The claim is 219 that if the lexicon does not propose such a sense it is unclear how it can arise 220 since it is not otherwise indicated by the context (Asher, 2011; Copestake & 221 Briscoe, 1995) . 222
Notwithstanding its intuitive appeal, the problems with this approach are 223 many (Asher, 2011; Blutner, 2002; Bosch, 2007; de Almeida, 2004; de Almeida & 224 Dwivedi, 2008; Falkum, 2007; Fodor & Lepore, 2002) . First, there seem to be 225 many cases where a verb makes a demand on a complement that its lexical entry 226 does not satisfy. In the generative lexicon account, such cases are seen as 227 semantically ill-formed: Pustejovsky (1998) gives as an example the VP enjoy the 228 rock, which does not have a default interpretation due to the lack of a telic role 229 defined for the noun rock. Exceptions arise, according to Pustejovsky, when the 230 object is construed relative to a specific activity, as in The climber enjoyed that 231 rock, where rock acquires telicity on the basis of the semantics of the subject NP. 232
However, consider the arguably well-formed utterances in (9) and (10). 233
(9)
Peter enjoyed the nice weather. 235 (10) Karen enjoyed the children. 236
237
Assuming that the intended interpretations here are that 'Peter enjoyed being 238 outside in the nice weather' and 'Karen enjoyed playing with the children', it is 239 unclear how they could be generated when there seem to be no telic information 240 in the lexical representations of the nouns weather and children that the coercion 241 mechanism could take as input to the compositional process. It is also difficult to 242 see how they could acquire telicity on the basis of the of the subject proper 243 nouns. Thus, it seems that the generative lexicon theory would either make no 244 interpretive predictions for cases such as (9) and (10), or wrongly predict that 245 they are ill-formed. Second, it is difficult to see how the rule-based account can 246 avoid making wrong predictions about many compositional interpretations. For 247 instance, the VPs begin a car and begin a thermometer should be interpreted as 248 'begin driving a car' and 'begin measuring the temperature', due to the telic roles 249 encoded by the complement nouns (cars are for driving; thermometers are for 250 measuring temperatures) (Fodor & Lepore, 2002) . It is unclear what would 251 prevent such clearly infelicitous interpretations from being constructed as 252 'default'. Third, by modelling the processing of logical metonymy entirely in 253 terms of a lexicon-internal process, the rule-based account is unable to account 254 for the interpretive flexibility that is arguably involved in these constructions. 255
Although preferred readings in uninformative contexts clearly exist (e.g., the 256 tendency to interpret the VP begin a book as 'begin reading a book' or 'begin 257 writing a book'), more specific contextual information can easily point the hearer 258 toward a 'non-default' interpretation, which would have to override the 'default' 259 reading (e.g., 'begin dusting a book', 'begin mending a book', 'begin designing a 260 book', 'begin ripping up a book', etc.). As a consequence, the rule-based account 261 must allow the compositional interpretations generated by the linguistic system 262 to be defeasible, but if this is so, some justification has to be given for why such 263 defeasible semantic rules are necessary in lexical interpretation, when 264 defeasibility is widely agreed to be one of the hallmarks of our pragmatic 265 capacity. 266
Many rule-based approaches give a similar analysis of the adjectival 267 specification exemplified by (2) above, repeated here as (11). 268 269 (11) Jane Austen wrote good books. 270
271
On the Pustejovskyan (1995) approach, the meaning of an evaluative adjective 272 like good is generated in linguistic context by a process of 'selective binding ', 273 which enables an adjective to make available a selective interpretation of an 274 event expression contained in the lexical representation (or the 'qualia 275 structure') for the head noun. In (11), the idea would be that good selectively 276 modifies the event description given by its telic role ('books are for reading'), 277 giving rise to the interpretation 'good reads'. This analysis runs into the same 278 sort of problems as that for 'logical metonymy' above. It has little to say about 279 uses where there is arguably no telic or eventive information for the adjective to 280 selectively modify but where the compositional process seems to proceed as 281 usual (e.g., good children, good weather). It must also appeal to pragmatics for an 282 explanation of non-default interpretations, for instance, the number of other 283 context-dependent ways in which a book could be good (e.g., 'entertaining', 'easy 284 to read', 'intellectually challenging', 'beautifully designed', 'useful to kill flies 285 with', etc.) 286 A seemingly stronger case for a lexical rule-based analysis is the type of 287 polysemy that patterns with the syntactic count-mass distinction, often referred 288 to as 'systematic polysemy' (cf. Apresjan, 1974) representation of the noun, thereby altering its denotation accordingly (e.g., 301
Copestake & Briscoe, 1992 & Briscoe, , 1995 Ostler & Atkins, 1992) . One such lexical 302 inference rule is the UNIVERSAL GRINDER (originally proposed by Pelletier, 1975) , 303 which creates from a count noun denoting a physical object a mass noun with 304
properties for an unindividuated substance, yielding the 'rabbit stuff' sense in 305 (12)a. above. In addition, the lexicon is thought to contain a set of 306 conventionalised sub-cases of this rule, including a specialised rule of GRINDING that forms food-denoting mass nouns from animal-denoting count 308 nouns, and a rule of FUR-GRINDING that forms fur-denoting mass nouns from 309 animal-denoting count nouns, yielding the 'meat' and 'fur' senses of rabbit in 310 (12)b. and (12) Turning to the examples of metaphorical and metonymic sense 347 extensions in (4) and (5) above, repeated here as (13) and (14), it is widely 348 agreed that consideration of discourse context is required for their 349 interpretation (e.g., Gibbs, 1994 has been proposed that since the metaphorical extension from animals to 358 humans with some particular characteristic(s), exemplified in (13), appears to be 359 8 Two reviewers pointed out that an analysis in terms of ellipsis of the NP head might also be possible for (12d-g) -where, for example, rabbit in (12g) might be an ellipsis for 'rabbit tracks', in a case where the prior discourse makes this interpretation available -with the consequence that such cases of specialised interpretations should not be seen as equivalent to the conventional interpretations in (12a-c). However, an ellipsis analysis might in principle also be possible for the conventional polysemy patterns in (12a-c), where, for instance, rabbit in the utterance Steven had rabbit for dinner might be seen as an ellipsis for 'rabbit meat'. While I do not think that this is the correct way to account for these examples, the fact that an ellipsis analysis might be possible for all the examples in (12), depending on the information given by the prior discourse, suggests to me that we have to do with a single phenomenon here. should also enable us to derive the senses in (13) and (14). 377
In this section, I have discussed rule-based approaches to polysemy. On 378 the basis of a set of standard examples, I have argued that in spite of making 379 accurate predictions in a number of 'default' situations, rule-based accounts 380 leave much work for the pragmatic system to do, both in overriding 'default' 381 interpretations in contexts where another non-default interpretation was clearly 382 intended, and in constructing unpredictable (non-rule-governed) 383 interpretations, for instance, in cases of metaphor and metonymy. But if 384 pragmatics can do this work, it seems likely that it can also do the part of the 385 interpretative work that rule-based accounts do adequately. In the next section, I 386 consider how the polysemy data can be analysed within a wholly pragmatic-387 inferential account of utterance interpretation. 388
An inference-based approach: polysemy as pragmatics 389
The challenge for code-based accounts of interpretation, even of the highly According to relevance theory, human information processing "tends to 404 be geared to the maximisation of relevance" (Sperber & Wilson, 1986 260), where relevance is seen a potential property of inputs to cognitive 406 processes (e.g., verbal utterances, gestures, facial expressions, etc.), and is 407 assessed in terms of the amount of effort used to process the input and the 408 'positive cognitive effects' the individual may derive from it (where a positive 409 cognitive effect can be described broadly as a 'worthwhile difference to the 410 individual's representation of the world'). Other things being equal, the more 411 cognitive effects an input yields to an individual and the less effort it takes to 412 process it, the more relevant it is to the individual at that particular time. 413
Further, relevance theory takes verbal utterances to constitute a special kind of 414 input, communicating "a presumption of [their] own optimal relevance" (ibid.). 415
By requesting the addressee's attention, the communicator conveys that her 416 utterance is more relevant than alternative stimuli competing for his attention at 417 the time. An optimally relevant utterance is one that achieves enough cognitive 418 effects to make the utterance worth processing, while avoiding causing the 419 hearer any unnecessary effort in achieving those effects. The hearer's goal in 420 communication is to find an interpretation of the speaker's utterance that meets 421 the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance itself. 422
In this framework, the distinction between linguistic semantics and 423 pragmatics is seen as corresponding to different processes involved in utterance 424 comprehension: (i) decoding of the linguistic material into a 'logical form', and 425
(ii) pragmatic inference. A logical form is seen as a structured set of concepts: a 426 'template' or 'schema' for a range of possible propositions, which contain slots 427 that have to be filled -a process that requires pragmatic inference (Carston, designing, mending, ripping up, etc.) which would involve accessing several units 512 of information and thus be more costly in processing terms. In this way, we may 513 account for why certain interpretations are often favoured over others without 514 being committed to the view that these are always computed as a result of 515 default inferences generated by the lexicon. 11 516
In relevance theory, lexical interpretation is seen as typically involving 517 the construction of ad hoc concepts -occasion-specific senses -which may be 518 narrower or broader than the linguistically encoded senses (Carston, 2002 ; 519 Wilson & Carston, 2006 Wilson & Sperber, 2012) . A mentally-represented 520 concept, a constituent of the 'language of thought' (Fodor, 1975 (Fodor, , 2008 
stereotypes and culture-specific information, and also, in many cases, imagistic 527 and/or sensory-perceptual representations (Sperber & Wilson, 1986 . 528 adjective good can be seen as encoding a very general concept, which, on most 544 occasions of use, will have to be pragmatically adjusted in order for the hearer to 545 arrive at the speaker-intended interpretation. Often, as in (18), the 546 encyclopaedic information associated with the head noun will play a key role in 547 this process. The pragmatic process of ad hoc concept construction is 548 considerably more flexible than the rule-based generative mechanism discussed 549 in 2.1 above, in that not only linguistically-specified information but any 550 activated encyclopaedic or situation-specific assumption can be used in deriving 551 the communicated concept, as long as the hearer's occasion-specific expectations 552 of relevance are satisfied. In this way, the relevance-theoretic account predicts 553 that good book may communicate different occasion-specific senses (e.g., a good 554 book could be one that is 'entertaining', 'easy to read', 'intellectually challenging', 555 'beautifully designed', 'useful to kill flies with', etc.). It also provides an account of 556 the problem cases for the rule-based approach, namely, examples such as good 557 children (e.g., 'well-behaved', 'diligent', 'responsible', 'caring', etc.), good weather 558 (e.g., 'sunny', but could be used to mean 'overcast' if in a fishing context, etc.), 559 good time (e.g., 'enjoyable', 'fun', 'relaxing', etc.), and so on (with no linguistically-560 specified purpose encoded by the head noun that could serve as input to lexical 561 rules), all of which would involve the construction of a different ad hoc concept 562 on the basis of activated encyclopaedic and/or situation-specific information, 563 constrained by the hearer's expectations of relevance. 564
Similarly, the uses of rabbit in (3) above, repeated here as (19), can be 565 analysed in terms of pragmatic narrowing where the concept communicated has 566 a more specific denotation than the concept linguistically encoded. expression leads the hearer to construe the entity referred to as individuated or 578 unindividuated respectively. 13 This provides a highly underspecified input to 579 pragmatic processing. Then, the pragmatic system will construct a narrower ad 580 hoc concept ('rabbit remains', 'rabbit meat', 'rabbit fur') on the basis of the 581 decoded concept, highly activated encyclopaedic information associated with it 582 (e.g., rabbits are animate creatures of flesh and blood, are edible, have fur, etc.), 583 often in combination with other contextual information derived from the 584 utterance situation (e.g. the knowledge that a convoy of trucks has just passed on 585 the highway, that Steven is a gourmet chef, etc.). 586
There are several advantages to this pragmatic account compared with a 587 standard rule-based account of systematic polysemy. First, it provides the 588 necessary interpretive flexibility for these constructions, allowing for a different 589 ad hoc concept to be constructed in each of (19) 12 Here I take an approach to the grammatical count-mass distinction on which there is no lexical or semantic difference between count and mass expressions, and that all differences follow from the syntactic structure in which they occur (cf., e.g., Allan, 1980; Borer, 2005; Bunt, 1985; Pelletier, 2012) . On this view, it is NPs, not nouns as such, that are the bearers of (syntactic and semantic) count and mass properties. Nouns themselves (and by extension the concepts they encode) are underspecified with respect to their count and mass properties. Further, assuming that the conceptual distinction between individuals and unindividuated entites is independent of count-mass syntax, our intuitions about the count or mass properties of many concepts (e.g., that the concept DOG is count but WATER is mass) may arise from mentally stored encyclopaedic (or real-world) knowledge about their denotations. This could also explain, at least in part, why some mass syntax embeddings seem less acceptable, or more 'marked', than others (e.g., ? 'I don't want book in this room' vs. 'I don't want books in this room'). 13 There is some experimental evidence that collective mass expressions such as furniture are perceived as denoting individuals (e.g., Bale & Barner, 2009; Barner & Snedeker, 2005, but cf. ; Wisniewski, Imai, & Casey, 1996) . This suggests that the grammatical distinction may not be a direct or perfect reflection of the conceptual distinction: sometimes there may be a conflict between linguistic conventions and real-world properties (e.g., furniture), or the real-world properties of a concept's denotation may allow for more than one possible construal (cf. French meubles). between an animal and its meat (or fur), and we can easily infer, upon 622 encountering a new kind of animal, that the relation also applies to this instance. 623
It seems likely that the same sort of inference would be made easily accessible to 624 us when we encounter an animal term with mass syntax (e.g., 'John loves rabbit'), 625 or when it occurs without a specification of its count or mass properties (e.g., 626
'John regretted the rabbit'), as a result of the activation of encyclopaedic 627 knowledge associated with the concept in question (e.g., the concept RABBIT concept LION, will cause the hearer to access encyclopaedic information stored 667 about its denotation (e.g., a lion is a large cat, is tawny-coloured, is a skilled 668 hunter, is strong, courageous, takes risks, etc.). Suppose that the most 669 contextually obvious referent for John is the speaker's colleague (JOHNx), who is 670 manifestly not a lion in any literal sense, but known to be a high-risk climber. 671
The encyclopaedic assumptions associated with the concept LION that are likely 672 to be added to the context in the interpretation of (20), then, would be a subset 673 of those that can be applied equally to humans (e.g., lions are strong, courageous, 674 take risks, etc.) and which contribute to the relevance of the interpretation. In order to save herself the effort of having to express a long, complex sentence 775 such as that in (22)b., the speaker can choose to use a sentence that does not 776 fully encode her intended meaning, and rely on the hearer using his pragmatic 777 capacity to turn it into a fully propositional representation. On this approach, our 778 pragmatic ability would be a useful add-on to our language capacity but would 779 not be strictly essential in enabling us to express ourselves and communicate the 780 way we do. Some version of this view of linguistic underdeterminacy is likely to 781 underlie many rule-based approaches to natural language processing. 782
The second, essentialist view takes linguistic underdeterminacy to be an 783 essential feature of the relation between linguistic meanings and speaker 784 meanings (ibid.). Given the complexity and fine-grainedness of the thoughts that 785 speakers can entertain and communicate to each other (e.g., their containing 786 private references to time, space, people events and so on), they generally do not 787 lend themselves to a full encoding by natural language sentences. So although 788 the sentence in (22) language users may find it easier to take an already existing word and extend it 837 to a new sense than to invent an entirely new word. One reason may be that the 838 stabilisation of a new word in a language is a relatively slow process that has to 839 be coordinated over a large group of individuals over time. But the typically 840 pairwise coordination involved in any given communicative act is a less 841 elaborate affair (for discussion, see Sperber & Wilson, 1998) . Given our 842 pragmatic ability to form hypotheses about speaker meanings on the basis of 843 linguistic utterances and contextual information, there would, in most cases, be 844 no need for a new word to describe something that may just as well be described 845 by using an already existing word with an extended meaning. 846
Although we find a basis for the existence of polysemy in both accounts 847 discussed here, it seems to me that it has a stronger motivation on the 848 pragmatic-inferential account, where it arises as a natural consequence of lexical 849 concepts being unable to fully encode speaker-intended concepts rather than 850 optionally as part of communicators' striving toward brevity. In the final section 851 of this paper, I will consider of some further implications of a fully pragmatic 852 approach to polysemy. 853
A fully pragmatic approach: perspectives and implications 854
In modern pragmatic theory, and relevance theory in particular, the capacity to 855 infer speaker meanings on the basis of the evidence provided is taken to be 856 reliant on the more general theory of mind capacity, that is, the ability to infer 857 and attribute contentful mental states to others (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; 858 
Polysemy in acquisition 870
It is widely agreed that young children's word learning requires an early capacity 871 for intention reading (e.g., Akhtar 19 . One study that specifically investigated children's ability to cope 878 with systematic polysemy found an early emerging facility for using pragmatics 879 in sense resolution (Rabagliati, Marcus, & Pylkkänen, 2010) . In this study, young 880 children showed an adult-like ability to make 'licensed' sense alternations, for 881 instance, to correctly interpret the conventional alternation between the movie 882 sense and the physical object sense of the word DVD, but were also more willing 883 than adults to accept 'unlicensed' senses, for instance, the physical object sense 884 of movie in The movie is shiny. 20 This suggests that in the early stages of language 885 learning, children may actually be more 'pragmatic' than adults in the sense that 886 they show an even greater degree of flexibility in interpretation, accepting 887 senses for words that go beyond those that adults find appropriate (or relevant). 888 (A weakness of Rabagliati et al.'s study is that the sentences containing the 889 systematic polysemy were presented to the participants in isolation, without a 890 supporting context. It is possible that if given contexts that clearly biased the 891 'unlicensed' senses, adults too might have been more likely to accept these 892 senses). 893 Rabagliati et al. (2010) suggest that a rule-based account could explain 894 these results in terms of children initially possessing a broad range lexical rules, 895 generating both licensed and unlicensed senses (cf. Copestake & Briscoe, 1995) , 896 some of which are 'unlearned' over time as a result of increasing exposure to 897 their language, a process which would involve ruling out infrequent senses from 898 their lexical repertoire. For instance, if children never hear the word movie used 899 in a physical object sense, they might discount the probability of there being a 900 rule that creates physical objects from abstract entities in their language. I find 901 this hypothesis very implausible, given the range of other polysemy-related 902 phenomena that children are able to cope with from a very early age, which are 903 unlikely to require the presence of any lexical rules for interpretation. This early 904 pragmatic competence should enable children to cope with cases of systematic 905 polysemy too, although it may sometimes overgenerate. Furthermore, one would 906 have to explain how such initially too broad rules develop quite independently of 907 the child's conceptual knowledge, given the tight connection that clearly exists 908 between systematic sense alternations and real-world regularities in the 909 language of adults. Another possible rule-based explanation could be that 910 children start out by being radically pragmatic, but acquire the lexical rules at a 911 later stage in development as a result of exposure both to their language and to 912 the real-world relations on the basis of which the lexical rules arise. While this 913 hypothesis seems more plausible, one would have to offer a reason for why the 914 'rules' must be part of the linguistic system and not rather an artefact of 915 conceptual organisation, reflecting highly predictable and regular states of 916 affairs in the world, where children's developing ability to handle systematic 917 polysemy could emerge as a by-product of acquiring a more adult-like 918 conceptual organisation and pragmatic competence. 919
Polysemy in diachrony 920
If the fully pragmatic account is on the right track, all synchronic instances of 921 polysemy should, in principle, be traceable back to the operation of a pragmatic 922 process. A prevalent hypothesis about semantic change is that its main driving 923 force is pragmatic, being motivated by speaker-hearer interactions and 924 communicative strategies (e.g., Traugott & Dasher, 2002) . It is also widely 925 thought that semantic change must go through a stage of polysemy, in which 926 related meanings of a word that emerged at historically different periods coexist 927 over time in a language, both in individual speakers and in language 928 communities (Hopper, 1991) . While rule-based accounts generally have little to 929 enabling them to end up with the same lexical senses but in many cases via 955 distinct routes (see Wilson & Carston, 2007 , for further discussion). 956
Non-verbal polysemy? 957
Another implication of treating polysemy as a fundamentally communicative 958 phenomenon in this way is that, in principle, we should expect not just words but 959 any simple ostensive stimulus, for instance, manual and facial gestures, to be 960 susceptible to polysemy. One example might be the use that car drivers make of a 961 
Final remarks 977
The central topic of this paper has been whether the aspects of meaning that are 978 involved in the construction of polysemy have a primarily linguistic or non-979 linguistic basis, and the extent to which its proliferation and development in 980 natural language can be explained given each of these views. More specifically, 981 the question has been whether polysemy results primarily from the operation of 982 lexicon-internal processes or from pragmatic-inferential processes applying at 983 the level of individual words. Some people may argue that the difference 984
